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tion of the Constitution of the United States, and that the cases
of the others were so "blended and commingled" with that case
that he would not distinguish them, it would be little consolation
to an injured state that at some future time, after the convicts had
been at liberty to prey for years on a suffering community, the
Supreme Court would say to him, " Sir, you were in the wrong."
But in order to be able to appreciate the remark of the judge at its
true value, it should be stated that when counsel subsequently
called his attention to it, and inquired in what manner a case thus
heard at Chambers could be reviewed, he replied he was satisfied
the statement was erroneous.
It seems almost unnecessary to remark that the mere fact that
the state court was without jurisdiction did not authorize the federal judge to interfere. The federal courts have no jurisdiction to
issue the writ of habeas corpus except in the cases provided by
law: Cabrera's Case, 1 Wash. C. C. 232; Dorr's Case, 3 How.
103; illetzyer's Case, 5 Id. 176 ; Kaine, in re, 14 Id. 103 ; 11illigan's Case, 4 Wall. 2 ; United States v. Rector, 5 McLean 174;
United States v. Jailer of Fayette. 2 Abb (U. S.) 265; Greathouse's Case, Id. 382; Parks' Case, reported ante, p. 84; and
no law of Congress has provided or could provide for interference
except in cases where the federal jurisdiction is in some way involved. We need not enumerate the cases, which are provided for
in detail. The federal judge did not claim that this was one, unless
the relators were restrained of their liberty for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or in violation of
the Constitution of the United States. Manifestly they were not.
In considering this case one naturally compares it with the case
in which Judge DURELL by his order set up a "state government.
There is one very obvious difference in the cases. The forms of
judicial propriety were wholly wanting in the Louisiana case. In
other particulars they rightfully may be classed together.
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An agreement to forbear suit on a pre-existing debt is a sufficient consideration for a note given therefor ; and an agreement so to forbear until the maturity of the note ull be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Partial failure of consideration is no bar to an action on a promissory note, but
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merely entitles the maker to recoupment for damages, or abatement of the plaintiff's demand, to tle extent the maker has suffered loss by the failure.

Parol evidence is admissible to show the consideration of a note, and to show
that the consideration in whole or in part has failed , but it canfiot be received to
contradict tile
terms of the note, or to attach to it conditions.

MOTION for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judg-

ment of the District Court of Lucas county.
This was an action, brought by Koch, Mayer & Goldsmith
against Holzworth, Sebastian, and Doering, upon a promissory
note for 068.60, payable six months after its date, made by Holzworth, Sebastian, and Doering to Koch, Mayer & Goldsmith.
The defendants filed a joint answer, setting up as a defence that
Holzworth and Sebastian signed the note as sureties for Doering;
that Doering was a merchant tailor, and Koch, Mayer & Goldsmith
drygoods merchants; that the note in question was given for a
balance of account due to them for goods furnished Doering for
carrying on his business; that Doering was, at the date of the note,
insolvent, and in order to enable him to pay his debts and continue
his business, Koch, Mayer & Goldsmith promised, if the defendants
would execute said note, to hold the same merely as collaten.il
security, and would furnish Doering goods on credit, to an amount
not exceeding $500, and continue such credit so long as Doering
should pay on account, and thus keep the credit within the limit
of $500, and make "some small payments, from time to time,"
.upon the note. And the defendants allege that this promise of
the plaintiffs was the sole consideration of the note; that the
promise was fraudulently made, with the intention never to fulfil
it, and that the plaintiffs had not kept the same, but, on the contrary, had failed, and refused to furnish the goods or to give the
credit so agreed upon.
The plaintiffs replied denying the matter set up in the answer.
Oi trial of the cause there was testimony tending to prove
the promise of the plaintiffs set up in the answer, and that the
plaintiffs have not fully complied with the same, but there was no
evidence tending to prove the alleged fraud in obtaining the note.
The evidence showed that the promise had been partly fulfilled,
by furnishing Doering goods, but to an amount less than $500.
The defendants' counsel asked the court to instruct the jury,
that if they found that the note in suit was given for an antecedent
debt of Doering, upon an agreement between the parties that it
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shouh be held solely as collateral security for the payment by
Doerincg of the antecedent debt for which it was given, and that
Doering should continue to make payments thereon as fast as he
could, without reference to the time of the maturity of the note,
then, as to IIolzworth and Sebastian, there was no consideration
for the note, and the verdict should be in their favor. They also
asked the court to instruct the jury, that if Holzworth and Sebastian were induced to sign the note upon the plaintiffs' promise and
agreement, as set forth in the answer, and that the plaintiffs failed
to comply therewith, "and thereby Doering was prevented from
carrying on his business as fully as he otherwise would have done,"
then Holzworth and Sebastian are not liable on the note.
This instruction the court refused to give, and instructed the
jury that, in order to entitle Holzworth and Sebastian to a verdict,
they must either show fraud in obtaining the note, or a total failure
of consideration; that if the plaintiffs' pr.mise, as set up in the
answer, was the ole consideration of the note, and the plaintiffs
had wholly failed to comply with or execute the promise, then the
sureties were entitled to a verdict; but that if an agreement of
the plaintiffs to forbear suit on the debt for which the note was
given, formed a part of the consideration, or if the promise set up
in the answer was the sole consideration, and that promise had
been partially executed, then under the pleadings as made up,
the sureties would not be entitled to a verdict. And the court
also told the jury that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, they
should presume that such an agreement to forbear did form part
of the consideration of the note.
To which instruction, and refusal to instruct, the counsel excepted; and the jury having returned a verdict for the plaintiffs,
judgment was entered thereon in their favor. To reverse this
judgment Ilolzworth and Sebastian prosecuted a petition in error
in the District Oourt, where the judgment was affirmed; and they
now ask leave to file a petition in error here to reverse the judgment of affirmance.
Scribner & Hard, and L. H. Pike, for the motion:As the debt of Doering was antecedent to the giving of the note,
there was, as to IIolzworth and Sebastian, no consideration for the
note, unless there was an agreement, on the part of the creditors,
to forbear the collection for some fixed and definite period: 2
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Amer. L. C. 209, 254-256; 8 Cush. 85; Bingham v. Campbell,
17 Ind. 396.
As we understand the law, the sureties may say to the creditors:
We were not bound to pay the antecedent debt of Doering to you.
We undertook with you that it should be paid by a certain period,
in consideration of your promise and agreement that you would
keep him supplied with goods; that you would continue him in
his business, thereby enabling him to make gains, from which to
pay the debt. This consideration, constituting a condition subsequent, which you were bound to perform, was, in its nature, an
entirety. In order to hold us liable you were bound to its reasonable, full performance. Your contract has not been kept; the
condition is unperformed; therefore we are not liable. Barge on
Suretyship 115, sec. 2; 5 B. & 0. 269; 1 Stark. 192; Campbell
v. Gates, 17 Ind. 126; DeColyer on Suretyship 30; Portage
County Rank v. Lane, 8 Ohio St. 405.

Kent, Newton &. Pugsley, contra:A parol contract can not be set up to vary a written one-that
is, in this case, the note-by changing its terms of payment.
If a promise was made to furnish Doering more goods, it would
amount to no more than a part of the consideration of the note;
that is, the whole promise, made by plaintiffs below, was the consideration of the note, so far as the sureties were concerned.
This promise was performed by extending time and by furnishing
goods.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WELCH, J.-We see no error in the instructions of the court,

or in its refusal to instruct as requested. In the absence of proof
to the contrary, the presumption was that the payees of the note
agreed to forbear suit on the debt until the note should mature.
There is no such proof in the case, nor is it even alleged in the
answer that there was no such agreement to forbear. This agreement, as well as the partial performance of the promise to furnish
goods, formed a sufficient consideration to support an action on the
note. The failure to furnish goods to the full amount agreed upon
constituted only a partial failure, which was no bar to the action,
and merely entitled the defendants to recoupment for damages, or
to an abatement of the plaintiffs claim, to the extent the defendants
may have suffered loss by the failure.
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But counsel for plaintiffs in error say, in effect, that the promise
to furnish goods, and not to enforce payment of the note faster
than Doering should be able to pay, was a condition attached to
the note, and that it is only upon full performance of that condition that payment of the note can be enforced. It is only necessary to say, in answer to this claim of counsel, that although parol
evidence is admissible to show the consideration of a note, and to
show a total or partial failure of that consideration, it cannot be
received for the purpose of contradicting the note, or attaching to
it parol conditions. The note contains an absolute and unconditional promise to pay its full amount at the end of six months, and
the defendants sought, by parol proof, to change this into a promise
to pay on condition the plaintiffs would furnish goods to Doering,
and to pay at such time or times as he might be able to pay.
This they could not be allowed to do, without violation of one of
the first and plainest principles of evidence.
Iotion overruled.
law: Foster v. Clark, 19 Pick. 329
That forbearance to sue an overdue
debt is a sufficient consideration for (1837).
Thus far there is little if any controa promise, even by a third party, to
pay the entire claim, has been un- rersy. Tie more difficult question is,
doubted law since the leading case whether forbearance to prosecute a
in the Exchequer Chamber of Rey- groundless c/aint is a good consideration.
The elementary writers quite generally
nolds v. Prosser, Hardres 71 (1656);
See Gdes v. Ackles, 9 Barr 147; Robinson assert that it is not. Addison, Chitty,
v. Gould, 11 Cush. 55. The loss or Hilliard, Leake, Metcalf, Parsons,
Smith and Story, seem to agree on this
suspension of the present right to sue,
incurred by the promisee, is quite suf- point. Let us examine some of the
ficient, even without any benefit to the cases upon which the doctrine is suppromisor: Morton v. Burn. 7 Ad. & E. posed to rest : Ilanmoon v. Roll, March
202 (1643), is often cited on that point.
And this consideration
19 (1837).
In that case A. and 3., being jointly
would undoubtedly support a promise to
bound on a bond to C., the latter repay a much larger sum than'the original
leased A., and afterwards B. promised
debt; as held in Smith v. Algar, 1 B.
& Ad. 603 (1830), where a promise to him that in consideration that lie would
pay 1071. at the end of seven days' for- "forbear him the payment of said
money due on said bond till such a day,
bearance to levy an execution for 601.
was considered valid. So also a promise he would pay it." tldd that B. was
to forbear to use some special means not bound " because there was no debt,
allowed by law to collect a legal debt, for it was totalIj discharged by the release
as, not to arrest the debtor, or not to to A." Herrinq v. Dorrell, 8 Dowl. P.
attach his goods, is a good consideration C. 604 (1840), rests upon similar
grounds. A creditor had taken two
for another's promise to pay the debt,
in whole, or in part, although the origi- joint debtors in execution, and then
nal suit against the debtor proceeds at discharged one ; which in law operated
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as a discharge of the other; hut a
friend of the latter promised to pay his
part of the debt, if the creditor would
also discharge him, which le did ; but as
he had no right to detain him longer, he
was held to have parted with no right,
and theretore had sustained no damage ;
and so there was no consideration for
the promise.
Edwards v. Bagh, 11 M. & W. 641
(1843), is much relied upon by the elementary writers. There, the declaration alleged that ," certain disputes and
controversies were pending between the
plaintiff and the defendant, whether
thu defendant owed him 1731., and that
the*defenlant, in consideration that the
plaintiff would not sue him for said
sum, promised to pay the plaintiff 100l.
in full satisfaction of said claim."
This declaration was held bad on demurrer, because it did not allege that
the defendant was in fact indebted to
the plaintiff, as he claimed. But this
was decided largely upon the peculiar
phraseology used in the declaration.
See Llewcllyn v. Llewellyn, 3 Dowl. &
Lownd. P. C. 318 (1845)
In Lloyd v. Lee, 1 Strange 94 (1718),
at nisi prius, a married woman had
given a note, and after her husband's
death, in consideration of forbearance,
promised to pay it. Hcld, that the note
was originally absolutely void, and not
merely voidable; and that "forbearance, where originally there is no cause
of action, is no consideration to raise
an assumpsit."
Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East 455
(1804). is often cited in support of this
rule. There a person indebted to the
plaintiff died, and his widow, before
any administration was taken out, promised to pay it in consideration of the
plaintiff's forbearance to sue ; but the
court held that as there wa; no person
in existence who could be legally sued
during the whole time of the forbearance, there was no legal loss to the
plaintiff, or suspension of his right of
VOL. XXV.-20

action, ani therefore there was no consideration for that particular promise.
See also Miartin v. Black, 20 Ala. 309
(1852).
One of the most recent and strongest
cases on this side of the question is
Palfregv. Portland, Saco 6- Port,%nouth
Railroad Co., 4 Allen 55 (1862).
There a man was instantaneously killed
by the negligence of a railroad compuny. By law his widow had no valid
claim against the company, but she preferred one, and the corporation by a
written agreement "in consideration
of the premises, and of her forbearance
to sue them, promised to pay her $50
a month during her life." They paid
the annuity for several years, but finally
declined, and being sued on their contract demurred to the declaration. The
court sustained the demurrer, saying :
"1It is a very ancient rule of law, that
a promise to pay money in consideration
of a forbearance to sue, when there is
no legal cause of action is without consideration and void: Toby 4- Wlrndhat's
Can-, 2 Leon. 105; Hawmaon v. Poll,
March 202; Chit. Cont. (7th Amer.
Ed.) 35."
These and other similar cases have
led even so careful an author as Judge
METCALF, to lay down the law that
"forbearance is not a good consideration to support a promise, unless there
is a good cause of action. It must be
a forbearance of what might be legally
enforced :" Met. Contracts, p. 175.
But notwithstanding this number of
respectable authorities, it may be
doubted whether the doctrine is supported by reason and analogy, to the
full extent, at least, to which it has
been asserted. Doubtless, if a person
knew he had no claim ; or supposed he
had not ; his forbearance to sue such a
claim would be no consideration, or
rather it would operate as a fraud on
the adverse party; and therefore his
promise to pay in consideration of such
forbearance, might be invalid. Such
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was the opinion in 117ade v. Siaeon, 2
C. B. 548 ; and of Cocxnuns, C. J.,
in Callishcr v. Bischoff lm, Law Rep.
5 Q. B. 452. But this is clearly on the
ground of fraud. But if the claim is bond
fide preferred, and is a fair matter of
controversy, why should not forbearance
to sue such a claim for ever, or even
for a limited time, be a good consideration for a promise to pay a part of it ?
Wherein, in principle, does it differ
from a compromise, so called, of a
doubtful claim ? All agree that a compromise or release of a doubtful claim
or right, is a good consideration, and
that a pronisor cannot show in defence
that the promisee had no valid claim or
right, which lie had relinquished. See
O'Kcsson v. Barclay, 2 Penna. St. 531;
Longridge v. Dorville, 5 B. & Aid. 117 ;
Russell v. Cook, 3 Hill 504; Keefe v.
Vogle, 36 Iowa 87 ; Blake v. Peck, 11
Verm. 483; and many other cases.
Modern cases also declare it is not
necessary a suit should be pending in
order to render such a compromise
binding
Cook v. Wright, I B. &
S. 559 ; Easton v. Easton, 112 Mass.
438. Nor is it necessary in such cases
that the original cause of action be
absolutely extinguished :Nash v. Armstrong, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 259. Wherein
then does such a compromise differ from
a promise "to forbear ?" In both the
promisor obtains freedom from the vexations and expenses of litigation. In
both he "buys his peace ;", in both the
promisee loses his right to sue, for a
longer or shorter time, as the case may
be. Why should not the same rule
apply ?
The more recent eases so incline.
Callisherv. Bischoffs helm, Law Rep. 5 Q.
B. 449 (1870), is a strong illustration.
The plaintiff alleged that certain moneys
were due him from the Honduras government, and he had threatened to take
legal proceedings against them to enforce payment, and that thereupon " in
consideration that the plaintiff would

forbear taking such proceedings for an
agreed time, the defendant (not the
original debtor), promised to pay him
6001." The plea was that "at the time
of making the alleged agreement, no
money was due the plaintiff fron the
Honduras government." To this plea
there was a demurrer. This was the
only question argued. COCKnURN, C.
J., said : " Our judgment must be for
the plaintiff. No doubt is must be
taken that there was, in fiact, no claim
by the plaintiff against the Honduras
government which could be prosecuted
by legal proceedings to a successful
issue ; but this does not vitiate the
contract and destroy the validity of
what is alleged as the consideration.
The authorities clearly establish that
if an agreement is made to compromise
a disputed claim, forbearance to sue in
respect of that claim is a good consideration ; and whether proceedings to enforce the disputed claim have or have
not been instituted makes no difference.
If the defendant's contention were
adopted, it would result that in no case
of a doubtful claim could a compromise
be enforced. Every day a compromise
is effected on the ground that the party
making it has a chance of succeeding
in it, and if he bondfide believes he has
a fair chance of success, he has a reasonable ground for suing, and his forbearance to sue will constitute a good
consideration.
When such a person
forbears to sue he gives up what he
believes to be a right of action, and the
other party gets an advantage, and,
instead of being annoyed with an action,
he escapes from the vexations incident
to it. - The defendant's contention is
unsupported by authority."
This was followed the next year in
the Court of Exchequer by the case of
Ochford v. Barelli, 20 Weekly Rep.
116, and 25 Law T. Rep. 504, which
does not seem to be reported elsewhere.
There a woman married her own uncle,
whose first wife, unknown to her, was
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still living confined in an insane asylum.
At his deth several years afterwards,
this second wife made a claim to onethird of his estate, to which of course,
she had no legal right. The heirs then
gave her this agreement: "In consideration of your abstaining from making and forbearing to make any claim
against our late father's estate, we
hereby undertake to pay you one-third
of the net value of his estate tip to the
time of his death."
In an action on this agreement the
only defbnce was a want of consideration, and that the plaintiff must have
known that her marriage with her uncle
was wholly void hy st. 5 & 6 Will. 4, c.
54, even if she were ignorant 6f the fact
that his first wife. was alive, and therefore
must he deemed to have known that she
had no legal claim to the estate ; but the
jury found that when the agreement was

made to forbear she believed she was
widow of the deceased, and entitled to
one-third of his estate. The court
held the forbearance suflicient consideration, and upheld the contract,
CII[NNELL, 13., saying: " We have
considered this case with the care which
the full arguments addressed to us deserved. We cannot distinguish it from
Callisher v. Bischoffshehn, the latest
authority on the subject, and we feel
bound by that decision."
Thus it appears we are warranted in
believing that upon the principle of the
thing, and upon the more recent aualond jdo
thorities, a.forbearanceto site
claim, as wel as a coniproniseof a pending suit, is a goo'l consideration.for a promise to pay, although in /fict or in ha the
prondsce would not harerecovered upon his
original clain.
E DIMUD H. BEqN ETT.

Court of Common Pleas, No. 3, of Philadelphia.
LOWRY

ET AL. V.

PLITT

ET AL.

After the proper interment of a body the control over it rests with the next of
kin who is living. It cannot be transmitted or transferred.
Where there were several next of kin in the same degree and they differed in
their wishes as to the disposition of the remains, a bill by the majority to enjoin
the others from interfering with the removal of the remains to another place, was
dismissed.
V hen a body has been properly buried in a vault, with the consent of all concerned ; quaere whether even the next of kin can remove it against the will of
the vault-owner though the latter be a stranger.

TmIs was a motion for an injunction heard on bill and answer.
The complainants were the three sons of Henrietta Lowry, and
the two executors of a deceased son, Lowry Donaldson Lowry;
the respondents were Sophia W. Plitt, Elizabeth S. Edwards, and
the Laurel Hill Cemetery Company. The bill set forth that
Mrs. Henrietta Lowry died January 12th 1866, at a house in
Philadelphia, which had been purchased and furnished for her by
her son, Lowry Donaldson Lowry, who was then residing at Lima,
Peru; that at the time of the decease of Mrs. Lowry neither she
nor any of her children had any place of family sepulture, and her
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remains were interred, without objection from any of her children
present at her death, in a lot in Laurel Hill Cemetery belonging
to her sister, Sophia W. Plitt; that, in 1869, Lowry D. Lowry
returned to Philadelphia, and died there in 1871, leaving a will,
wherein he bequeathed $5000, to be appropriated to building a
vault in Laurel lill Cemetery, in which lie directed to be placed
the remains of his mother, and of any of his brothers and sisters
who had died, or might thereafter die-also his own remains and
those of his immediate family; that the vault had been completed,
but that respondents refused permission to the executors of Lowry
D. Lowry to enter Mrs. Plitt's lot for the purpose of removing
Mri. Lowry's remains to her son's vault. The bill prayed an
injunction, forbidding respondents from hindering the removal.
The answer of Mrs. Plitt and Elizabeth S. Edwards admitted the
main facts set forth in the bill, but averred that Mrs. Lowry left
a daughter surviving, viz., the respondent, Elizabeth S. Edwards;
that the father, mother, four sisters, and a son of Henrietta Lowry
were, previous to and at the time of her death, buried in the lot
at Laurel Hill belonging to Mrs. Plitt, and which the latter had
purchased with the'concurrence of Mrs. Lowry for a family burial
lot; that Mrs. Lowry, before her death, repeatedly expressed a
desire to be buried in that lot, and on her death-bed gave express
directions to that effect. Respondents denied the right of complainants to remove the remains, and declared that such removal
would do great violence to their feelings.
Before the argument one of the three sons of Mrs. Lowry, complainants in this bill, died, and another one withdrew from the
cause and opposed the removal.
-Findlay and Thomas, for complainants.
Edward Shippen, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FINLETTER, J.-The controversy is about the right to disinter
and remove, after appropriate obsequies, which were considered
by all interested as final.
In Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 6 Wright 293, it is clearly and
broadly decided that, after interment, all control over the remains
is with the next of kin. The reasoning which transfers this right
from the widow is not satisfactory, because it does not seem to be
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based upon principle or reason; and is repugnant to the best
feelings of our nature.
Such a right must necessarily be in the next of living kin. It
is only the living who can give the protection, or be burdened with
the duty of protection from which the right springs. It is only
the living whose feelings can be outraged by any unlawful disturbance of the dead. From this it follows that it is a right which
cannot be transmitted or transferred. It is, moreover, one in
which all of the next of kin have an equal interest. The plai,,tiff,
therefore, derives no authority over the remains of his mother from
his brother's will; and in himself lie has no better claim than his
sister or brother. le is then without that clear, exclusive title,
which alone is enforced by injunction.
When it is considered that the removal of the remains of Mrs.
Lowry, involves an invasion of the rights of Mrs. Plitt, it is not
clear that, even if all the next of kin had joined in these proceedings, we could have granted the relief prayed for. The law regards
with favor "the repose of the dead." When they are inurned in
the places selected by them, it must be something more than sentiment or abstract right which will induce us t6 enforce the claim
of the next of kin, by the invasion of the burial-place of another.
In such a case it may well be questioned whether the right of the
next of kin exists at all.
This doctrine is more than foreshadowed by Chief Justice READ,
in Wnkoop v. IWynkoop, when he says: "Besides, the fact that
her son is deposited in her burial-place, in consecrated ground,
and that he was buried with the ceremonies of the church, and
with the honors of war, is sufficient to justify us in refusing permission to a renloval under the circumstances."
Mrs. Lowry was buried where she desired to be; with the acquiescence of all her children. Those of them who survive are divided
upon the question of removal. She is with her father, mother,
sisters, and her first born. Upon the granite which marks their
resting place her name is graven with theirs; and beneath it their
ashes have commingled. It is fitting they should remain undisThe bill is dismissed.
turbed.
We present this case to our readers,

of this kind, " it is of rare occurrence

although not a decision of a court of
last resort, as one of a class of cases not
As said
often met with in the reports.

that any dispute arises after the burial,
or that any case has been submitted to
a court for its decision."

-- ,p-

It is not necessary to trace the growth

by Mr. Justice READ, in re,-..-
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of ecclesiastical jurisliction in these

On behalf of Gilbert it was argued

matters in England, as the rules of law
that ground once given to the interment
there have never been adopted in this
of a body is appropriated for ever, and
country, and possess but little more than
the insertion of any other body into
an historical interest for us. BLACICthat space at any time, however distant,
is an unwarrantable intrusion.
STONE shows clearly the state of the law
The
judgment of the court was that the use
in his day when the ecclesiastical juof an iron coffin was not unlawful, but
risdiction in these matters had become
fully settled. Ile says : "Though the that it could only be allowed upon pay-heir has a property in the monuments
ment of a larger burial-fee. The court
and escutcheons of his ancestors, yet
in reply to this latter argument said:
he bns none in their bodies or ashes;
"The legal doctrine certainly is that
nor can lie bring any civil action against
the common cemetery is not res unius
such as indecently, at least, if not imcetatis, the exclusive property of one
piously, violate and disturb their regeneration now departed, but is likewise
mains, when dead and buried.
The
the common property of the living and
person, indeed, who has the freehold of
of generations yet unborn, and subject
the soil may bring an action against
only to temporary appropriation. * * *
such as dig and disturb it * * * - 2
Even a brick grave without the authority
Black. Com. 429.
Coirr says : "The
of the ecclesiastical magistrate is an
burial of the cadarer is nullius in hoais aggression upon the common freehold
and belongs to ecclesiastical cognisance;
interest, and carries the pretentions of
but as to the monument, action is given
the dead to an extent that violates the
at the common law for the defacing
first rights of the living :" Gilbert v.
thereof:" 3 Inst. 203.
Buzzard, 3 Phill. 335.
These principles were enforced by
In Reg. v. Tu,.ss, 10 B. & S. 298, it
the King's Bench in the case of King v.
was held that ground consecrated for
Coleridge, 2 B. & Ald. 806; 3 Phill.
burial purposes cannot be applied to
337, n. ; which arose upon proceedsecular purposes, nor the bodies of the
ings begun by one Gilbert for a manda- dead buried in it removed by the owners
mus to compel the churchwardens of the
of the soil without the authority of an
parish in which he lived to permit him
Act of Parliament.
to bury his wife in the parish graveyard
In Reg. v. Sharpe, 7 Cox C. C. 214 t
in an iron coffin. The mandamus was
where a son, from motives of filial affecrefused, the court saying that the right tion and religious duty, removed the
of sepulture was a common-law right,
corpse of his motber from a family
but the mode of burial was of ecclesiasburial-place in a desecrated burialtical cognisance alone. The case was
ground, for the purpose of interring it
then carried into the Consistory Court,
with that of his family in a consecrated
before Sir WILLIAM SCOTT, upon arti- church-ground, it was held that the act
cles against the churchwardens for their
constituted an indictable misdemeanor.
refusal to permit the burial as demanded
ERLEJ,., said, in delivering the opinion
by Gilbert. The reasons urged by the
of the court : " Our law does not recogwardens for their refusal were that the
nise the right of any one child to the
parish was a large one and had but
corpse of its parent, as claimed by the dethree small burying-grounds, and if a
fendant. Our law recognises no procoffin of imperishable material was used
perty in a corpse, and the protection
the grounds would soon become useless
of the grave at common law, as contraand it would he impossible for all the
distinguished from ecclesiastical protecparishioners to find room for burial.
tion to consecrated ground, depends on
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this form of indictment, and there is no
authority for saying that relationship
can justify the taking of a corpse from
the ground where it had been laid." s.
c.Dears. & B. 160.
Two controversial books on the subject of burials have lately appeared in
England ; one "The Burial Question,"
by Charles J. Burton, Chancellor of
the Diocese of Carlisle ; and the other,
" Oi the Law relating to Burials,"
published anonymously.
The earliest case that we have found
in America is a curious controversy
which arose in Pennsylvania over the
remains of Stephen Girard, a number
of yeari after his death : In re Stephen
Girard,4 Am. L. J. 97; 5 Pa. I,. J.
Rep. 68. Girard directed in his will
that his body should be buried in the
ground of the Holy Trinity Catholic
Church; this was done. The councils
of the city of Philadelphia, which was
the residuary legatee under his will,
removed his remains from their first
resting-place, by permission of the
board of health and of the authorities
of the church, and left them temporarily
in the charge of an undertaker, in order
to a subsequent removal to a sarcophagus built for them at Girard College,
where, it appeared, they were to be
buried with Masonic ceremonies. A
bill was filed by some of Girard's relatives, praying for a special injunction to
restrain this action and an order on the
city authorities to restore the remains to
their former resting-place. Judge KING,
in deciding the motion, said: " Where
a person was buried in a common burying-ground, where the title did not pass,
the law did not furnish a remedy in
reference to a removal ; hut a chancellor
would intervene to prevent" the desecration of the grave. If I had been
applied to before the removal of the
body, I would have interfered. But
this is not the case here. The city
claims as the residnary legatee and her
motive was to indicate respect and

honor for the memory of the man. If
the executors chose to disclaim it they
might have done so, if they were executors, but if they disclaimed, the relatives might be parties alone. In all
these aspects a court of equity might interfere. But the body has been removed
and the relatives had a knowledge of
it. Even here the court can interfere :
but ordering the body back to its former
place would be deciding the case ; we
are not asked to do this now. It would
be deciding the case before a hearing."
The court then ordered that the body
be placed in the sarcophagus at Girard
College, as the most convenient temporary abode, until its final resting-place
should be determined at the final hearIng.
In this case the English doctrine,
as set forth by

BLACKSTONE,

was cited

by eminent counsel as the law in Pennsylvania ; but, as it appears above, the
court did not find it necessary to decide
the point. A case arising soon after
this in New York received very full
consideration at the hands of Samuel
B. Ruggles, in a report to the Supreme
Court, as referee "in the matter of
widening Beckman street," in the city
of New York. In that case it appeared
that the commissioners of estimate, &e.,
had paid into court the sum of $28,000;
as damages for certain land taken in
widening that street. The land taken
belonged to the Brick Preshvterian
Church, and contained "vaults for the
burial of the dead in which various individuals claimed rights of interment,
and the use thereof for the funeral of
the dead." One Sherwood had been
interred in this lot in 1801 and his remains had rested there quietly ever
since.
His descendants claimed that
the expense of re-interring them in such
suitable place as they might select, and
of erecting the monument that had
always stood over them, should be paid
out of this fund. It did not appear that
any burial-fee had ever been paid to
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the church for permitting the body to
be buried there. The refieree was of
opinion that the use of this cemetery was
a charitable as well as a religious use,
, trust which a court of equity in the
exercise of its undisputed equity powers
might duly control and regulate ; * **
that it was proper to retain from the
fund a sum sufficient to cover the expense of' re-interring the remains of.
Moses Sherwood in a separate ground
in such reasonable locality " as his descendants might select." In his report,
the referee drew " the following conclusions, as justly deducible from the
fact that no ecclesiastical element exists
in the jurisprudence" of New York.
"i . That neither a corpse, nor its
burial, is legally subject, in any way,
to ecclesiastical cognisance, nor to
sacerdotal power of any kind.
"2. That the right to bury a corpse and
to preserve its remains, is a legal right,
which the courts of law will recognise
and protect.
"3. That such right, in the absence of
any testamentary disposition, belongs
exclusively to the next of kin.
"4. That the right to protect the remains includes the right to preserve
them by separate burial, to select the
place of sepulture, and to change it at
pleasure.
"5. That if the place of burial betaken
for public use, the next of kin may
claim to be indemnified for the expense
of removing and suitably re-interring
their remains."
The Supreme Court, at a special
Term in 1856, confirmed this report in
all respects and decreed accordingly;
and also directed the church to re-inter
separately the remains found in any
other of the graves whenever identified
by the next of kin. See 4 Bradf.
(Appendix) 502.
This case contains a very full exposition of the law of burial, and has been
cited with approbation by the courts of
other states.

In I Vynkoop v. Mynkoop, 6 Wright 293,
the case was this : Col. Wynkoop died
in 1857, and was buried with military
honors at P'ottsville, in a lot belonging
to his mother. Within a year his widow,
who was also his administratrix, endeavored to remove his remains, but
was refused permission by the owners
of the cemetery and by her husband's
next of kin. She thereupon filed a bill
for an injunction restraining the defendants (the owners of the cemetery, the
owner of the lot and her husband's next
of kin)from interfering with the remo val.
The court, in dismissing the bill, held,
that as administratrix the complainant's
duty to bury terminated with the burial,
and that as widow, "lsh e would appear
in that case to have no rights after the
interment." The court further said,
"that the fact that the body was deposited in his mother's burial-place in
consecrated ground, and that he was
buried with the ceremonies of the church
and the honors of war, was sufficient to
justify a court of equity in refusing
permission to a removal under the
circumstances." This decision cannot
be extended beyond the particular state
of facts upon which it was based. It
appears that the lot was owned by the
mother of the deceased, and that he had
been buried there by his wife's consent.
The court, therefore, only decided that
a widow who consented to her husband's
burial in a certain place, could not,
against the wishes of his family, be
allowed to remove his remains. It
appears to leave undecided the question
as to what voice a surviving husband or
wife has in deciding where the deceased
wife's or husband's remains shall be
interred in the first place.
It has beesf decided that a husband
has control over the remains of his
wife: See the Ohio case, infra. It is
reasonable that a widow, administering
to her husband's estate, should, as
against his heirs, choose his final resting-place, though this has never been
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decided. If she waives her right to
administer, it would appear from the
cases that the remains are under the
control of the next of kin : See 4
]3radf. 503, supra. The reason given
for depriving the widow of what would
seem to be a natural right does not seem
altogether satisfactory: it is that a widow
may marry again and the custody of
her husband's remains may thus pass
into the hands of strangers. But in
most cases burial-lots descend as real
estate, and would commonly remain in
the family of the husband, if originally
his property. Arguments drawn from
the civil law or even the English law
would not avail in America, as the perpetuation of families, in the male
branches, had in the early Roman
system and has always had in England
an importance which it does not possess
in this country, and an essential part
of this idea lay in the preservation in
the line of the family of the tombs and
monuments of the dead and of all the
heirlooms and relics of tle race.
It has been said that the expressed
wishes of a testator as to the disposition of his remains will prevail over
the wishes of his family : 4 Bradf. 503,
supra.
Bogert v. Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 138,
was an action by Indianapolis against
Bogert charging him with violation of
a "cemetery ordinance." The court
(per PERKtxs, J.) said arguendo: "We
lay down the proposition, that the
bodies of the dead belong to the surviving relatives, in the order of inheritance, as property, and that they have
the right to dispose of them as such,
within restrictions analogous to those
by which tle disposition of other property may be regulated. They cannot
be permitted to create a nuisance by
them. Hence a by-law might be reasonable where population was dense,
requiring those buried to be sunk to a
certain depth, or to be buried outside
of where population was or was likely
VOL. XXV.-21

to become dense, and within a reasonable time after deatl. &c. ; but we doubt
if tie burial of the dead can, as a general proposition, be 'taken out of the
hands of the relatives thereof, they
being able and willing to bury the
same."
A remarkable case that arose in
Cleveland, Ohio, is reported (not very
carefully) in Am. Law Times, July
1871. The body of the plaintiff's wife
was delivered to the defendants, who
were physicians, for the purpose of dissecting its throat, in order, in tme interest
of science, to discover the cause of
death. The defendants promised to
perform the operation in tie presence
of the friends of the deceased. and to
give the body a decent burial By
statements of time dangers of infection
the defendants deterred the friends from
attempting to see the remains at the
medical college and held a pretended
funeral on the day before the time ap.
pointed. It appeared afterwards that
they had retained the body for general
dissection and performed the funeral
ceremonies over a coffin filled with rub
bish. Upon a discovery of this fraud
and upon threats of criminal prosecution the defendants sent the body in a
rough box to the relatives of the deceased. The husband, who had beenabsent from home, upon his return
brought suit for daiages for laceration
of feelings, expense of recovering the
body, &e., and for the fraud. PRENTISS,

J., in overruling a demurrer filed by
defendants, said "A corpse is not in
itself so far property that it could be
made an article of merchandise. A
court would not enforce a contract for
the sale of a dead human body. The
same reasons which forbid the enforcing
of such a contract, require that somebody shall have the right to tile care
and custody of a body for the purpose
of securing it a decent burial. For
this purpose the law gives a husband
tile custody of the dead body of his

162

1OME INS. CO. v. BALTIMORE WAREHOUSE CO.

wife. a parent of a child anl a child of
a parent. The remedy (fbr infringing
this right of custody) must be by civil
action. * * * A body itself may not

be property; but this right may be
called perhaps a quasi property. At
any rate it is a right which the law will
enforce, and for an infringement of
which an action will lie."
Pierce and 11ife v. Proprietorsof Swan
Point Cemetery and Almira T. Metcaif,
10 R. 1. 227, was the reverse of 1I|ynkoop
v. ll7nkoop, supra. There the deceased,
Metcalf, had died in 1856 and been buried in his own lot in Swan Point Cemetery, with the consent of his widow and
in accordance with his own wishes. At
his deatb this lot became the property of
his only child, Mrs. Pierce. In 1869,
against the consent of this daughter, and
in violation of the by-laws of the defendant corporation, his remains were removed by his widow, and placed in
another lot in the same cemetery. His
daughter filed a bill in equity to compel
the restoration of the remains to their
first resting-place. The widow demurred
to the bill for want of equity. The other
defendant submitted to such order as the
court might make in the case. The
court, in overruling the demurrer, was
of opinion that the remain- should be
restored to the place from which they
had been taken. The view taken was
that the person having charge of a body
(in this case the corporation defendant)
holds it as a sacred trust for the benefit
of all who have an interest in it from

family or friendship and that a court of
equity will regulate this trust and change
the custody if improperly managed. In
this view, it was said, that it was not
necessary to decide what might have
been done had the child assented, or
what the child might do of herself; and
further that, although a body is not property, it may be considered a sort of
quasi property to which certain persons
may have rights, as they have duties,
towards it arising out of common humanity. This case contains a very full
discussion of the question.
The latest case we have found, except
the principal case, is Secor's Case, 31
Leg. Int. 268. There it appeared that the
widow of the deceased had decently interred her husband's remains, when his
son, who averred that he had purchased
a lot of ground pursuant to the instructions of his father (for a family buryingground), insisted upon that being the
proper place of interment. The Supreme Court for King's county, New
York, upon motion of the widow,
granted a perpetual injunction to restrain the son from removing the
remains of his father. PnATT, J., in
delivering judgment, said : "A proper
respect for the dead, a regard for the
tender sensibilities of the living, and the
due preservation of the public health,
require that a corpse should not be disinterred or transported from place to
place, except under extreme circumThis ruling
stances of exigency."
was sustftined on appeal.

Supreme Court of the United States.
I031E INS. CO OF NEW YORK v. BALTIMORE WAREHOUSE CO.
A policy of insurance taken out by warehouse-keepers, against loss or damage
bv fire on '' merchandise, their own or held by them in trust, or in which they
have an interest or liability, contained in" a designated warehouse, covers the
merchand.c itself, and not merely the interest or claim of the warehouse-keepers.
If the merchandise be destroyed by fire, the assured may recover the entire value
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of the goods, not exceeding the sum insured, holding the remainder of the amount
recovered, after satisfying their own loss, as trustees for the owners.
Goods described in a policy as "merchan d ise held in trust " by warehousemen,
are goods intrusted to them for keeping. The phrase " held in trust "is to be
understood in its mercantile sense.
A policy was taken out by warehousemen on "merchandise" contained in
their warehouses, ' their own, or held by them in trust, or in which they have an
interest or liability." Depositors of the merchandise, who received advances
thereon from the warehousemen, took out other policies covering the same goods.
Held, that the several policies constituted double insurance, and that they bear a
loss proportionally.
In a case of contributing, policies, adjustments of loss made by an expert may
be submitted to the jury, not as evidence of the facts stated therein, or as obligatory,
but for the purpose of assisting the jury in calculating the amount of liability of
the insurer upon the several hypotheses of fact mentioned in the adjustment, if
they find either hypothesis correct.
What evidence may be submitted to a jury from which they may find a waiver
of preliminary proofs.
No part of a letter written as an offer of compromise is admissible in evidence.

ERROR

to the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The most important question in this case relates to
the proper construction of the defendants' policy of insurance. It
is contended on their behalf that it covered only the warehouse
company's interest in the goods contained in the warehouse. If
this is the true meaning of the contract, the instruction given by
the Circuit Court to the jury was erroneous. If, on the other
-hand, the policy covered the merchandise itself, and not merely
the interest which the warehouse company had therein, there is
no just ground of complaint of the charge of the circuit judge.
Blanket and floating policies are sometimes issued to factors or to
warehousemen, intended only to cover margins uninsured by other
policies, or to cover nothing more than the limited interest which
the factor or warehouseman may have in the property which he
has in charge. In those cases, as in all others, the subject of the
insurance, its nature'and its extent, are to be ascertained from the
words of the contract which the parties have made. It is as true
of policies of insurance as it is of other contracts, that except when
the language is ambiguous, the intention of the parties is to be
gathered from the policies alone. There are cases in which resort
may be had to parol evidence to ascertain the subject insured, but
they are cases of latent ambiguity. So, in the construction of
other contracts, parol evidence is admissible to explain such am-
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biguities. In this particular the rule for the construction of all written contracts is the same. Lord MANSFIELD said long ago that
courts are always reluctant to go out of a policy for evidence respecting its meaning: Loraine v. Tonlinson, Doug. 564. And so are
the authorities generally : Astor v. The Union Insurance Co., 7
Cowen 202; Murray v. Rateh, 6 Mass. 465; Levy v. Merrill, 4
Greenleaf 480; Baltimore Fire 1ns. Co. v. Loney, 20 Md. 36 ;
Arnold on Insurance 1316-17 and notes; Greenleaf on Evidence,
vol. 2, 377. It is no exception to the rule that when a policy is
taken out expressly "for or on account of the owner" of the subject
insured, or "on account of whomsoever it may concern," evidence
beyond the policy is received to show who are the owners, or who

were intended to be insured thereby. In such cases the words of
the policy fail to designate the real party to the contract, dnd
therefore, unless resort is had to extrinsic evidence, there is no
contract at all : Finney v. The Bedford Ins. Co., 8 Mete. 848.
Turning, then, to the policy issued to the plaintiff below, and
construing it by the language used, the intention of the parties is
plainly exhibited. Its words are: The Home Insurance Company
"insure Baltimore Warehouse Company against loss or damage
by fire to the amount of $20,000, on merchandise hazardous or
extra hazardous, their own or held by them in trust, or in which
they have an interest or liability, contained in" a certain described warehouse. There is nothing ambiguous in this description
of the subject insured. It is as broad as possible. The subject
was merchandise stored or contained in a warehouse. It was not
merely an interest in that merchandise. The merchandise of the
warehouse company, owned by them, was covered, if any they bad.
So was any merchandise in the warehouse in which they bad an
interest or liability. And so was any merchandise which they
held in trust. The description of the subject must be entirely
changed before it can be held to mean what the insurers now contend it means. If, as they claim, only the interest which the warehouse company had in the merchandise deposited in their warehouse was intended to be insured, why was that interest described
as the merchandise itself? Why not as the assured's interest in
it? Throughout the policy, wherever the subject intended to be
insured is spoken of, it is described not as a partial interest, not as
a mere lien for advances and charges upon the goods held in storage, but as the property itself, whatever might be the existing
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.rights to it. Thus the insurance company covenaitted to make
good to the assured all such loss or damage, not exceding the sum
insured, as should happen by fire "to the property as above spe"cified." What that specification was we have seen. The policy
also contained a provision that in case of fire the "property" destroyed might be replaced by similar "property" of equal value
and goodness. There are other like designations. Nowhere is any
-less interest in the goods insured alluded to than the entire ownership. The words of the policy are not satisfied if their import be
restrained as the plaintiff in error seeks to confine it. The parties
to whom the policy was issued were warehouse-keepers, receiving
from various persons cotton and other merchandise on deposit.
They were empowered by their charter to receive bailments and
to make charges against the bailors for handling, labor and custody. They were also authorized to made advances upon the
goods deposited with them, and their charges, expenses, advances
and commissions were made liens upon the property. They had
therefore an interest in the merchandise deposited with them, which
they might have caused to be specifically insured. It was also
at their option to obtain iusurance upon the entire interest in the
merchandise, whether held by them or by the depositors. Nothing
in their charter forbids such insurance. It is undoubtedly the law
that wharfingers, warehousemen and commission merchants, having
goods in their possession, may insure them in their own names, and
*in case of loss may recover the full amount of insurance, for the
'satisfaction of their own claims first, and hold the residue for
the owners: Waters v. The Monarch Assurance Co., 5 E. & B.
870; London & Northwestern Railway Co. v. Glyn, 1 E. & E.
652; De Forest v. Fulton Ins. Co., I Hall 136; Siter r. lloritz,
13 Penna. St. 219. ' Such insurgence is not unusual, even when
not ordered by the owners of goods, and when so made it enures
to their benefit. And such insurance, we must hold, the ware.house company sought and obtained by the policy of the plaintiff in
error. The words "merchandise held in trust" aptly describes
-the property of tle depositors. The warehouse company held merchandise in trust for their customers, not, it is true, as technical
trustees, but as trustees in the sense that the goods had been
intrusted to them. They were not empowered by their charter to
hold property under technical trusts cognizable only in equity.
Hence, when they sought insurance of merchandise held by them

166

HOME INS. CO. v. BALTIMORE WAREHOUSE CO.

in trust, it must have been intended of such as they held in trust,
in a mercantile sense, goods intrusted to them by the legal Qwners..
That such is the meaning of the words as used in this policy we
cannot doubt. And such has been held by ourts of the highest authority to be the meaning of similar words in fire policies.
In Waters v. The Monarch Fire 4-Life Assurance Co., above
cited, the policy was issued to persons described as corn and flour
factors, who were in fact flour merchants, warehousemen and
wharfingers. It was on goods in their warehouses, and on goods
in trust or on commission therein. The assured had in their warehouses goods belonging to their customers deposited with them as
warehouse-keepers, and on which they had a lien for charges for
cartage and warehouse rent, but no further interest of their own.
They made no charge to the customers for insurance, nor was the
customer informed of the existence of the policy. It was ruled
that the goods were held in trust, within the meaning of the policy,
and, there having been a destruction by fire, that the assured were
entitled to recover their entire value, applying so much as necessary to cover their own interest, and holding the remainder as
trustees for the owners. Lord Chief Justice CAMPBELL said " it
was not intended to limit the policy to the personal interest of the
plaintiff, for in this and all other floating policies, the promise is to
make good the damage to the goods."
A similar ruling was made in the London and Northwestern
Railway Company v. Glyn, suvpa. There the plaintiffs, who were
common carriers, had obtained insurance of goods against fire in a
company of which the defendant was treasurer. The policy declared 150001. to be insured "on goods their (the plaintiffs') own,
and in trust as carriers" in a certain warehouse, and it was stipulated that the company were to be liable to make good to the
"assured," all loss which they, "the assured," should suffer on the
property therein particularized. In an action on the policy, it was
held that to the extent of 15,000L, the whole value of the goods in
the warehouse in the plaintiffs' possession was insured by it, and
not merely their interest in the goods, and that the plaintiffs would
be regarded as trustees for the owners of the amount thus recovered,
after deducting their charges as carriers.
In opposition to this construction of the policy now before us,
our attention has been called by the plaintiffs in error to a provision in the charter of the warehouse company, and to the notice
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accompanying the receipts they gave for the merchandise delivered
to tiin in storage. The tenth section of their charter, after requiring that the receipts, warrants or warehouse certificates issued
by the corporation for goods, wares and merchandise in their possession, should be signed by the president or vice-president and
secretary, and attested by the corporate seal, after requiring that
copies of them should be registered, and declaring that they should
be transferable by endorsement, enacted that every such receipt,
warrant or warehouse certificate should contain on its face a notice
that the property mentioned therein was held by the corporation
as bailees only, and was not insured by the corporation. Accordingly
all the warehouse receipts did contain such notices. But we are
unable to perceive how these facts can have any bearing on the
proper construction of the policy. The company was not prohibited by its charter from obtaining insurance to their full value of
the goods left with them in bailment. At most, the requirement
of the charter was that they should not themselves become insurers. And the notice required to be given to the bailors meant
no more than that neither the receiving of the goods nor the certificate of receipt amounted to a contract of insurance. It would be
straining the language of the notice most unwarrantably, were we
to treat it as amounting to an engagement that the company would
not obtain insurance of the property from some corporation authorized to insure.
Without pursuing this discussion further, we have said enough
to vindicate our opinion that the policy upon which this suit was
brought, covered the merchandise held by the warehouse company
on storage, and not merely the interest of the bailees in that propdrty. It follows, necessarily, that there was double insurance.
The policy issued to the warehouse company and those obtained by
the depositors of the merchandise covered the same property, and
they were for the benefit of the same owners. The persons assured
were the same, for if the policies taken out by Hough, Clendennin
& Co. were upon their goods, notwithstanding the memorandum
that the loss, if any, was payable to the Baltimore Warehouse
Company, as may be conceded was the case, so was the policy now
in suit. The insurers are liable, therefore, pro ratd, each contributing proportionately. It follows that the plaintiffs in error have
no reason to complain of the refusal of the court below to affirm
their first and seventh points, and none to complain of the in.truc-
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tions given to the jury respecting the extent to which the plaintiffs
were entitled to recover, if they could recover at all.
The next question presented by the record, which we propose to
consider, is raised by the fourth, the seventh, eighth and the ninth
assignments of error. Those assignments complain of the affirmance
of the plaintiffs' fifth point, and of the disaffirmance of the 'defendants' third, fourth and sixth. Beyond doubt it was a question for
the jury whether furnishing preliminary proof of loss was waived
by the defendants or by their authorized agent, if there was any
evidence of waiver to be submitted to them. And we think there
was such evidence. The defendants were an insurance company
of the state of New York. By the act of the Maryland legislature,
which empowered them to do business in Maryland, the agent of
the company was required to have authority. " from the parent office
or offices to settle losses without the interference of the officer or
officers of the said parent office or offices." Mr. Coale was their
agent, and clothed with such authority. He could, therefore,
waive the presentation of preliminary proofs, and his waiver was
binding on his principals: FranklinFire Ins. Co. v. The .Chicago
Ice Co., 86 Md. 102. A waiver may be proved indirectly by circumstances as well as by direct testimony. If, after the time for
presenting preliminary proofs had gone by, Mr. Coale acted and
spoke as if they had been presented in season; if, while resisting
the claim upon his company, he placed his objections entirely upon
other grounds, and never alluded to any failure of the plaintiffs to
exhibit preliminary proofs until those other grounds were apparently
swept away; if, after making a payment for a loss of twenty-four
bales of cotton, and after he was notified that the policy would be
retained in order to assert afterward other claims upon it; he
expressly waived another one of its conditions, for the purpose of
giving to the plaintiffs a continuing right to bring a suit, the jury
might .well have inferred that the condition of giving notice of the
loss and making preliminary proof had been waived. Such conduct on his part was consistent with a conclusion that such a waiver
had been made. It is difficult to account for it if there had been
none. Yet all this evidence and more was before the jury. These
assignments of error, therefore, cannot be sustained.
The sixth assignment of error requires but a single remark.
We do not see that the evidence warranted the hypothesis upon
which the defendants' second prayer was based, but if it did, it
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would be impertinent to the case. If "theplaintiffs were mistaken
in regard to their rights as against other insurers, such a mistake
cannot affect their claim on the defendants' policy.
The tenth assignment has already been shown to be unfounded
by what we have heretofore said.
It remains only to notice some rulings of the Circuit Court in
respect to offers of evidence. The court admitted in evidence,
notwithstanding objection by the defendants, several statements or
plans of adjustment of the loss made by an expert, and founded
upon different theories of the law. They were not admitted as
evidence of the facts'staled in them, or as obligatory upon the jury,
but only for the purpose of assisting the jury in calculating the
amount of liability of the defendants upon the several hypotheses
of fact stated in them, and stated only hypothetically. It is impossible that the defendants could have been injured by their
reception, and without-some such assistance no intelligent verdict
could have been rendered. The jury was left free to accept either
hypothesis, or reject them all. We think there was.no error in
admitting the calculations.
Nor was there error in receivipg the record of the suit of IIough,
Clendennin & Co. v. The People's Ins. Co., in the Maryland courts,
under the. circumstances of the case. The preseht parties had
agreed to extend the time within which this suit. might be brought,
ufitil the decision of the questions involved in the suit of Hough,
Clendennin & Co. " The record of that suit, therefore, was evidence
to show its termination. But if not, it was merely irrelevant, and
atnd it is not shown that it tended in the least to mislead the jury;
as judgment is not to be reversed because evidence was admitted
at the trial which could have had no bearing upon the issue, unless
it appears that it was misleading in its tendency. The only
remaining assignment of error is that the Circuit Court would not
receive in evidence any part of a letter written by the President
of the warehouse company to Mr.. Coale, the defendants' agent.
The letter was an offer of compromise, and as sueh, upon welI
recognised principles, it was inadmissible. And it contains no statement which can be separated from the offer, and convey the' idea
which was in the writer's mind. The court was clearly right in
rejecting it.
Tle judgment is amrmea.
VOL. XXV.-22
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Supreme Court of Mi8ouri.
STATE v. POTTER.
A bond regular infonn, cannot be avoided by a surety, upon the ground that it
was delivered in violation of a condition upon which it was signed by such surety,
such condition being that the principal should not make such delivery until it was

also signed by a certain other person, and the obligee having no notice of such
condition.
TE case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court which
was delivered by
SHERWOOD, J.-We are to determine whether a curator's bond,
regular in form, can be avoided at the instance of a surety, upon
the ground that he had signed it under a conditional agreement,
made at the time with the principal, that the latter was not to
deliver the bond untir the signature of a certain person had also
been obtained, and that notwithstanding such agreement and in
violation of it, the bond was delivered.
The question has been one prolific of litigation, and the conclusions reached by different tribunals have frequently exhibited no
inconsiderable lack of uniformity.
But it is thought that many decisions, which at first blush
appear incapable of being harmonized, will be found, on more
narrow examination of the controlling facts incident to each, to
bear a closer resemblance than casual observation would, at the
outset, lead us to suppose. In intimate connection with the subject
under discussion, we are asked to review some of our former
decisions in order that it may be ascertained whether they will
bear the test of a closer and more deliberate examination than
hitherto bestowed; an examination commensurate, both with the
importance of the topic involved, and with the greater facilities
now offered for such investigation, in consequence of recent and
elaborate adjudications, some of which were not accessible, or else
were overlooked, at the time our own, now sought to be examined,
were rendered.
In the case of the State v. Sandusay, 46 Mo. 377, the point in
hand was not involved; there were neither the proper averments in
the answer, in respect to a conditional delivery of the bond, nor if
there had been such averments was there any evidence adduced
which could have been offered in their support; "the only real
defence" was, a denial by the defendant of his signature. Any
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remarks, therefore, in that case, relative to the matter now before
us, cannot be held as possessing authoritative value. And the same
may be said of Cutter v. 117tttemore, 10 Mass. 442, referred to in
the case just cited. So far as Gasconade Cuunty v. Saunders, 49
Mo. 192, has relevancy to the present case, it is an authority favoring the position of the beneficiary in this action; for the point is
there conceded in argument that "where the principal in a bond,
or other person not acting as the agent of the creditor, fraudulently procuring the names of sureties to a bond, and the creditor
takes the bond and loans his money without any knowledge of the
fraud practised on the sureties, he cannot be made to suffer by
such fraud. Their remedy is against the party who defrauded
them, and not against the creditor ;" and thejudgment of the trial
court may have been reversed, because of failure to recognise the
validity of the defence that the defendant's signature was procured
by the fraud and forgery of the agent of the county.
Linn County and State to use, ft., v. Parris,52 Mo. 75, gives
full recognition to the doctrine of the condition of delivery of a
bond by one co-obliger to another, and of the invalidity of such
delivery when violative of previously imposed conditions. From
the meagre statement it does not appear whether or not the officer
who received the bond was cognisant of the facts afterwards relied
on as a defence. Ther ., however, the name of one of the apparent
sureties was forged; but in the line of remark pursued in the opinion, no particular stress -was laid on the forgery, only so far as its
existence showed a failure of compliance with antecedent requirements; and the decision is altogether based on the idea that,
in consequence of the terms imposed by the surety not having
met with performance, no valid execution.of the bond had occurred,
although, curiously enough, a remark of similar import to that
already quoted from C-asconade County v. Saunders, is indulged
in. Now, if these episodal observations asserting the true rule in
relation to the rights of an ordinary creditor, who is not aware
of nor a participant in the fraud practised by the principal on
his surety, be correct, would it not seem to follow that a like
rule should prevail where, under similar circumstances, the officer
appointed for that purpose is the recipient of either an official bond
or of one for the direct payment of money ? May it not be asked
with much pertinence wherein the attitude of the county or state
differs from that of a private individual in this regard, and may
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not those who assert the existence of a difference in this respect
be called on to establish bysomething more than mere assertion
why the creditor should not "be made to suffer by such fraud" on
the one hand, while the county or state is ' made to suffer"
on the other ?
In J-ycrs v. iilroy, 53 Mo. 516, a division of opinion occurred
as to the method pursued in the discussion of that case, the majority opinion proceeding on the theory of conditional delivery to
a co-obligor, while that of the minority concurred in the result
upon the peculiar facts. There the suit was on a non-negotiable
note, signed by the surety on the express condition, which was not
complied with by the principal, that he would obtain the signature
of another surety before delivering the note to the creditor. And it
was held that these facts constituted a valid defence, and that the
same rule was applicable to all instruments not negotiable, whether
notes or bonds. The conclusion reached was a correct one, whatever may be thought of the reasons on which it was based, for it
was conceded throughout the whole case that the plaintiff was
apprised of the condition on which the surety was to be bound.
Knowing this, the plaintiff acted in bad faith in his acceptance of
the note, and therefore should have been denied a recovery on
that ground alone, regardless of other considerations; and this
last ground was the one which induced'the concurrence of those
whAo, disapproving of the reasoning employed, joined in the approval of the result. In both of the two-preceding decisions it
will be observed that t6l sole basis of the ruling is a lack of power
in the co-obligor to make the delivery of the instrument in question. Other authorities relied on by defendant as sustaining the
action of the court below will now be noticed, including those on
which the cases just cited were based.
Pawling v. United States, 4 Cranch 219, is to the effect that
if a surety signs an official bond, and delivers it to his principal,
on condition that others, whose names were inserted in the body
of the bond, should also sign it, that this delivery of the bond
only made it an escrow, and if the requisite signatures were not
obtained, that the surety was not bound.
In Duncan v. United States, 7 Pet. 435, the bond also lacked
completeness in a similar manner. It does not appear whether
there was any defect or irregularity in the bond in suit in the case
of the United States v. Lefer, 11 Pet. 86, and the only point
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considered was, as to the competency of certain witnesses rcspecting the condition of execution of the boud. The circumstances
under which the evidence was held competent are not set forth;
and in all probability the facts were like those of Pawling v.
United States, supra, and it was controlled by that decision.
Seeley v. People, 2 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 344; s. c. 27 Ill.173, holds that where a party signs his name to a bond as
co-surety with another, and such other's signature had been
forged, the surety supposing the signature to be genuine, will
not be liable. But the case also arquendo condemns in pointed
terms the doctrine which it is cited as upholding, and evidently
proceeds upon the theory that to the surety not the slightest
negligence was attributable.
In Leaf v. Gibbs, 4 C. & P. 466, the surety was t o sign upon
condition that his mother should do the same, but she refused, and
as the plaintiffs were informed of the terms on which the son's
signature was obtained, he was held not liable, unless knowing the
facts he had waived the objection.
Penny v. Patterson, 5 Humph. 133, was, in its salient features,
similar to the one just mentioned. A compromise was effected
between a debtor and the attorney' of his creditor, whereby it was
agreed that two sureties should sign a note with the debtor, and
that this note, when signed by sureties who were named and agreed
to be received, should be accepted, and operate as a stay for twelve
months of the judgment, for the amount of which the note was to
be given. A blank note was accordingly prepared with three
seals, which was signed by one of the sureties, on condition thatthe other intended surety should sign also. This the latter refused,
but the attorney to whom the note had been delivered by the principal, never received the note in payment of the judgment, as he
Andstill insisted on having the two sureties, as per agreement
besides, the note was not delivered to the attorney in execution
of the agreement, "but merely lodged with him, till such time as
the surety could be induced to sign it." So that the note was incomplete; it was never delivered; and the attorney with whom it
was "merely lodged" knew all about the attending facts.
The head-notes of this decision are inaccurate and well calculated to mislead; there was no "ignorance of the creditor" of the
circumstances, unless the knowledge of the attorney is to be deemed
the ignorance of his employer. The remarks, therefore, as to the
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effect of the creditor's ignorance are wholly outside of the case,
since the proof shows nothing of the sort.
Carter v. Mc6lintock, 29 Mo. 464, simply declares -that no
delivery of a note occurs where the payee surreptitiously obtains
possession thereof, and that he cannot maintain an action thereon.
Pideock v. Bishop, 3 B. & C. 605, holds merely that where a
creditor and his debtor have made a secret arrangement, which,
without the knowledge of the surety, increased his responsibility,
that this was a fraudulent concealment, of which the creditor could
not take advantage, and accomplished the sureties' exoneration.
The gist of the decision in Lloyd v. Howard, 15 Q. B. 995,
is, that if a bill of exchange be delivered by A. to B., for a specific purpose, which the latter does not accomplish, but retains
the bill till overdue, and then delivers it to C. without value,
that C. is not a bond fide holder, and cannot maintain an action
against A. as endorser. Palmer v. .ichards, 15 Jar. 41, was
based on a different state of facts. The bill was endorsed by A.
in order to have it discounted and delivered to B. for that purpose, who applied it to his own purposes, by depositing it prior to
maturity, as security for money advanced, and held that the endorsement of A. bound him.
Aude v. Dixon, 6 Exch. 869, seems to establish that if a blank
in a negotiable note be (contrary to a previous stipulation with
a surety, that another surety shall sign, before delivery), filled
with the name of the party as payee who advances the money
on it, that the surety is not bound. The note there, however,
would appear to have been incomplete, as a blank space was left
where the intended surety was to sign. But if this circumstance
was not taken into account, the decision is clearly contrary to the
decisions of this court, and of other American tribunals: 1 Pars.
N. & B. 111, and cases cited.
10 Jur. N. S. is not accessible, but if we may rely on a report
of the case of Swan v. N. B. AustralasianCo., 2 Hurlst. & Colt. 175,
the facts were substantially these: A. was induced by his broker to
send him blank forms of transfer, which the broker filled up with
numbers and descriptions of shares different from those of the
company intended by A., being shares in the defendant's company,
and by means of a duplicate key, which he had procured to be
made without the knowledge of A., obtained certificates from a
box of A.'s, necessary to perfect the transfer, and also forged the
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names of the attesting witnesses, and held, in action against the
company for damages, arid for a mandamus to restore the plaintiff's
name to the registry, that the acts of the plaintiff were not such as
estopped him from showing that the deed of transfer was a forgery.
In short, the ruling goes only so far as to assert that the combined aets of larceny and forgery on the part of the agent did not
estop the plaintiff from the assertion of his rights, and it would
have been strange, indeed, had the ruling been otherwise, since it
is plain to see that merely trusting blank forms of transfer to the
agent did not enable him to perpetrate a fraud upon a third party,
but in addition thereto it required a contemporaneous conjunction
of two crimes in order to the fraud's consummation.
In Preston v. Hale, 23 Gratt. 600, the bond was incomplete on
its face, lacking the name of the payee, and the single point decided was that parol authority would not authorize any one to fill
tile blank left, in the absence of the principal.
Johnson v. Baker, 4 B. & Ald. 440, shows the instrument, a
composition deed, to have been incomplete when delivered to one
of the creditors to procure the signatures of the others therein
named.
Thatcher v. Austin, 11 Verm. 447, discusses the point of delivery, but there the bond displayed its own incompleteness in the
lack of signatures corresponding with the names inserted in its
body, and there the court expressly says: " If the bond contains
the names of other obligors, and is delivered without the signatures
of all, the obligee must inquire whether those who have signed consent to its being delivered without the signatures of the others."
Now, if the duty of inquiry on the part of the obligee has its origin
in palpable omissions in the bond, would it not seem to follow, with
conclusiveness, that no inquiry is requisite where no defect exists ?
The bond mentioned in State Bank v. Evavs, 3 Greene (N. J.)
155. was incomplete, in that it lacked the signature of Olden, one
of the named obligors.
In Lovett v. Adams, 3 Wend. 380, the only point in judgment
was the propriety of the rejection of two co-obligors as witnesses;
but the occasion was improved to the discussion of other points.
Besides, the report of the case clearly shows that nine sureties
signed a bond for the payment of a certain sum of money, and
sent the bond to be delivered to the plaintiffs on condition that previously arranged terms were complied with, whereby such sureties
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would be indemnified against the risk incident to their suretyship.
The plaintiffs refused acceptance of these terms, andl subsequently,
by a new and different arrangement, entered into with five of the
obligors (without the knowledge or consent of the remaining four)
accepted the bond and then brought suit, not against the five who
had, but against the four who had not consented to such an
arrangement.
In Beduson v. .Noyes, 7 Wend. 188, the sheriff, the recipient
of the bond, was cognisant of the conditions upon which the surety
signed, and in effect promised that those conditions should either
meet with compliance or else bail should be procured.
In Hferdman v. Bratten, 2 Hlarrington 396, the bond was plainly
incomplete. That case was decided, however, on another point,
the alteration of the bond by the erasure of certain names which
were in the body of the bond, at the time the signing in question
occurred; and, moreover, the sheriff, to whom the replevin bond
was executed, was apprised of the express condition on which the
surety signed, and afterwards, it seems, erased the names of those
whose signatures he was to procure.
In Bibb v. Reid, 3 Ala. 88, the administrator's bond was lacking in nothing, and it was hel that it was capable of delivery to
a co-obligee as escrow, and was invalid unless on performance of
conditions; and some of the same authorities already examined
were-cited in support of the position.
The People v. Bostwick, 32 N. Y. 445, is based on a portion
of the authorities heretofore noticed. There was no infirmity patent on the face of the bond, and the case was discussed on the
theory both of the delivery of a bond to a co-obligee as an escrow
to await the fulfilment of prior requirements, and on that of estoppel,
and the conclusion reached favoring the former view and relying
on it, as opposed to the latter.
A result diametrically opposite to the on just announced, has
been reached in Indiana, in which after an exhaustive examination
and discussi6n of the authorities; it is held not only that one surety
is incapable of delivering a bond or othr instrument of like nature
to his co-obligor, as an escrow, but that the surety was bound
regardless of the giving, or disobedience of secret instructions, if
the instrument was perfect on its face. and the co-obligor clothed
thereby with apparent authority to deliver it. And the case of
Pepper v. The State, 22 Ind. 399, has been expresssly overruled in
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Pe7er v. The State, 31 Ind. 76, where the cause came the
seeonid time before the Supreme Court. Similar rulings had been
also made in Deardorff v. Poreman, 24 Ind. 581; 5 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 539; Blaekwell v. State, 26 Ind. 204, and Wfebb v.
Baird, 27 Ind. 368.
Baqot v. State, 33 Ind. 262, does not militate against these
rulings, though the case is very loosely and obscurely reported,
anl a great deal of unnecessary matter introduced. The substance
of the case and of the point in judgment is this: That parol authority is insufficient to authorize one having no connection with an
official bond to sign the name of a third person to such bond, unless
the signing takes place in the presence of him giving the verbal
authority. The opinion was delivered by FRASER, J., who was on
the bench with RAY and GREGORY, JJ:, when all the cases subsequent to Pepper v. State were decided and who had delivered an
emphatic opinion on petition for rehearing in Pepper v. State, in
which he explicitly concurred with his associates in upholding the
doctrine announced by them in 24, 26 and 27 Ind., supra, and
who were still his associates when Bagot v. State, was decided.
Under these circumstances, the assumption is a very bold one that
the judge who delivered the decision in the case last cited, or those
who concurred with him therein, intended to announce any doctrine variant from their prior conclusions. The rule thus enumerated is this : "That where the surety places the instrument perfect
upon its face in the hands of the proper person to pass it to the
obligee, the law justly holds that the apparent authority with which
the surety has clothed him, shall be regarded as the real authority;
and as the condition imposed upon the delivery was unknown to
the obligee, therefore, the benefit of such condition shall not avail
the surety."
And, to use the language of FRASER, J., in delivering the opinion
of the court on motion for re-argument in Pepper v. State, "the
subject had been examined by all the judges in consultation to the
extent of a critical inspection (to a considerable extent repeated)
of the cases cited, and of those referred to by all other courts, as
supporting the ruling of this court in this cause when formerly
here. The result has been, not only a clear conviction on the part
of the whole bench, as expressed in the opinion in this and the
.Dearderff case, but also a wonder how, upon a thorough examination
of the subject, any other conclusion could be arrived at."
VOL. XXV.-23
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It has doubtless been observed, that in nearly all the cases relied
on by defendant, of which I have given the gist, the judicial utterances were mere obiter dicta, or else there was something apparent
on the face of the bond evincing incompletion, or some attendant
circumstance showing knowledge, or its equivalent, on the part of
the recipient of the bond, or other instrument, that its delivery
was not to occur, unless other signatures were first obtained, or
other antecedent acts done of equal importance.
This is true of every case instanced from other states, except that
of People v. Bostwick, and Bibb v. Reid, supra, the latter of which
discusses only, and very briefly, the question of conditional delivery
by one co-obligor to another; and that is the ground whereon the
decision in People v. Bostwick is chiefly based; and our own adjudications, as above seen, are exclusively based on that ground.
Did we care to press the point, it might not, perhaps, in a manner
at all consonant with rudimentary definitions, be easy to explain
how an instrument could be claimed an escrow unless delivered as
such to a third person; nor how, if an escrow, it could be incomplete. But we are content to waive the point, since it is not plainly
necessary to the proper disposal of this case, being desirous of
placing that case on broader grounds than those incident to a
narrow technicality.
An estoppel in pais is said to arise when act is done, or statement made, by a party, which cannot be contradicted without fraud
on his part, and injury to others, whose conduct has been influenced
by the act or admission: Lickbarrow v. liason, 2 T. Rep. 63, 70.
Here the surety who defends this action, had invested the principal
with an apparent authority to deliver the bond; and there was
nothing on the face of the bond, or in any of the attending circumstances, to apprise the official who accepted it, that there was any
secret agreement which should preclude the acceptance of the bond,
and the surety is alone in fault in the matter, as but for his
unwarranted trust in Turley, the latter would never have had it in
his power to occasion the loss which the beneficiaries of this bond
must suffer, if the defence made by the surety is successful.
Surely then, a more opportune application of the language of
Lord HOLT in Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289, could not occur, than
in the case before us, that "seeing that somebody must be a loser by
this deceit, it is more reasonable that he that employs and puts trust
and confidence in the deceiver, should be a loser rather than a
E'ran ger.
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If the doctrine of estoppel would not apply here, might not the
significant query well be asked, to what state of facts would it apply?
Now, the rule is well settled, that if I stand by, and, without
objection, see another dispose of my property, I cannot be afterward
heard to assert ownership in it ; and, this, in accordance with the
maxim: "That he who did not speak when he should have spoken,
shall not be heard, now that he should be silent." In such instances
the question of power to make the sale and pass the title is one
not worthy of a moment's consideration. The only proper inquiry
is, did I, by my silence, give the purchaser reason to infer that
his vendor had the right to dispose of the property ? If so, then,
upon every principle of fair dealing, the true basis of such estoppels,
I am estopped to assert anything to the contrary of what my silence
might naturally be inferred to indicate, and the hypothetical case
is by no means stronger than the real one under discussion. For
the officer to whom was committed the duty of taking the bond
had literally conformed to that duty, by the acceptance of an instrument perfect in every particular, and emanating from the proper
custody; and he had, therefore, the right to infer, and it was the
defendant's conduct which gave origin to this reasonable inference,
that the delivery of the bond was in conformity to the usual course
of such transactions.
A stronger case of estoppel could not well be considered than
this, where a surety, after standing by for years, and allowing the
patrimony of orphans to be squandered, now steps in, at this late
(lay, and asserts that, owing to a hitherto undisclosed arrangement,
lie, although apparently bound for any default of his principal, was
not in fact bound.
This subject of estoppels, and under what circumstances they
arise, considered with reference to bonds, has recently undergone
discussion in the national Supreme Court, and the same result
reached as above, and the rulings made in Pawlingv. U ;Uvd Statcs,
which is the basis of all subsequent kindred decisions in this country, is explained on grounds entirely satisfactory, and similar to
those already adverted to. Dair v. United States, 16 Wall. 1.
To the same effect are exhaustive and elaborate discussions in
Virginia and MNaine: .Nash v. Fugate, 24 Gratt. 202; State v.
Peck, 53 Me. 284.
But ther6 are other elements which also enter into a proper consideration of this cause, and which, on that account, should not be
ignored. Are not sureties sufficiently solicitous about escaping
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from what they regarded, when signing, as remotely contingent
possibilities, without opening new avenues to facilitate their eager
escape ? And would it not be acting in flagrant violation of one of
the most familiar rules of evidence, and of the very spirit of the law
itself, to permit formally executed securities to be annulled by testimony of some contemporaneous parol agreement? If, under
ordinary circumstances, such testimony would be objectionable,
would it not be doubly obnoxious in cases like this one, where the
agreement is kept sedulously concealed from the other contracting
party ? There is but one answer, an emphatic affirmative, can be
returned to these questions.
Again, it concerns the state, that the heritage of the helpless,
confided to the protection of her courts, should not suffer detriment.
The consequences would be fraught with disaster, and it would be
subversive of the plainest dictates of public policy, if sureties in
such cases were permitted, by means of some "ill-remembered
conversation" or some occult understanding, never disclosed but
under the shadow of impending loss, to escape liabilities which
their own solemn deed and recorded specialty announces them to
have incurred.
The reasons appear conclusive that the following declaration
of law asked by plaintiff should have been given :"Although the court may believe from the evidence that the
defendant, Jabez H. Potter, may, at the time of his signing the
bond sued on, have had the agreement with James M. Turley, the
principal in said bond, that said Turley was not to file said bond,
or deliver the same, until Win. E. Bothrick also executed said bond
as surety; yet, if said bond was afterwards, in violation of gaid
agreement, filed by said Turley in the county court of Pettis county, Missouri, and was approved by said court, and said bond was,
when so filed and approved, complete and regular upon its face,
and the officers of said court had no notice of said agreement between said Turley and said Potter, then such agreement constitutes
no defence to this suit, and the court must find for the plaintiff,"
and that the one of a contrary effect should have been refused. In
so far as our former decisions are in opposition to this view they
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.'
are overruled.
IThe subject of the foregoing case has been fruitful of litigation. Some further
authorities and discussion will be found in the notes to Seeley v. The People, 2
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 344, and Insurance Co. v. Brooks, 3 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 399.
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United States C'ircuit Court, District of 3-rinnesota.
OWtENS,

AssIGNEE, v.

GOTZIAN

ET AL.

The judgment of a state court will be regarded by the federal courts sitting within the territorial limits of the state il which the same is rendered as a domestic
judgment.
The service of sunmmuons by a party to the action is an irregularity that is
waived by the other party unless objected to before the entry of judgment, and it
cannot therefore be taken advantage of by a third party when the judgment is attacked in a collateral proceeding.
"Party to the action," as usel in sect. 47, eh. 66, p. 456, R. S. Minn., held to
extend only to parties named in the proceeding, and not to those who though iaterested, do not appear on the reord.

Tins was an action brought to recover damages for the conversion by the defendants to their own use of certain personal property alleged to belong to the bankrupts' estate. During the trial
the record of a judgment rendered in a District Court of the state
of Minnesota, in an action in which the present defendants were
plaintiffs, and the bankrupts were defendants, was introduced in
evidence, and proof was made that the defendants purcliased' the
property in question at a sheriff's sale under execution issued upon
such judgment. The plaintiff offered to prove that the service of
summons in that suit was made by a silent partner of the firm of
Gotzman & Seabury, and urged that such service was invalid, and
the judgment void, by virtue of thp following statute of the state
of Minnesota:"The summons may be served by the sheriff of the county where
the defendant is found, or by any other person not a party to the
action :" R. S. Minn., sect. 47, p. 456. The testimony offered was
objected to by the defendants.
-Davis, O'Brien & Wilson, for plaintiff.
George L. Otis and Rogers & Rogers, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-Two propositions are involved in the objection:1. Is the judgment of the state court a foreign or domestic
judgment ?
2. If a domestic judgment, can the plaintiff attack it in this
suit ?
In nearly every instance where the judgment of a federal court
NELSON,
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sitting within the same territorial limits, has been the subject of
consideration in a state court, it has been regarded as a domestic
judgment: Thomson v. Lee Co., 22 Iowa 206, and cases cited.
For obvious reasons the judgment of a state court should be regarded as domestic by the federal courts in the same state; both
federal and state courts enforce and give effect to the same laws.
summon jurors from, and their judgments operate upon and com
pel seizure and sale of the property of, the same citizens, and they
are not, therefore, foreign to each other.
Being a domestic judgment it may be shown to be void upon its
face if the court rendering it had no jurisdiction of the defendants'
persons, and it is equally true that, except for errors affecting the
jurisdiction of the court, its validity cannot be questioned. if
jurisdiction of the persons was obtained in this case in the state
court, this court must regard it as conclusive of the question determined, and give it full force and effect. The record discloses
personal service upon the defendants, yet the plaintiff urges that
the service was made by one of the parties to the action and that
such service is not permitted, and renders the judgment a nullity
as to strangers to the action. This proposition is not without
force. If the statute prescribes the mode and manner of service
of summons, and authorizes it to be made by any person except a
party to the action, the question may well be asked why a judgment entered up without any appearance of the defendants thus
served is not beyond the authority of the court rendering it? Why
should strangers to the judgment be prevented from establishing,
perhaps a prior lien, or a superior encumbrance, on showing the
service of summons was by an incompetent person ? The answer
is, that this error in the service did not affect the jurisdiction of
the court, and is only an irregularity. The actual service upon
the defendants appears in the record, and no objectien being made
before judgment is rendered, the defect is cured by the entry.
Such is undoubtedly the rule as between parties to the suit, and it
is reasonable that strangers to the record should not impeach it in
a collateral action. The service shows a defect in obtaining jurisdiction, not a want of jurisdiction, and it is presumed the court
when judgment was rendered determined the service attempted
sufficient and passed upon that question: 22 Iowa 880; 2 Abb.
P. 844. Again, an inspection of the record shows that the person who served the summons, although perhaps a silent partner

